Гуманитарные ведомости. Вып. 2 (46) 2023 г

Гуманитарные ведомости ТГПУ им. Л. Н. Толстого № 2 (46), июль 2023 г. 6 SHAME IN THE ETHICAL TEACHINGS OF R. DESCARTES AND B. SPINOZA The paper deals with Rene Descartes’s and Benedict Spinoza’s conceptions of shame and clarifies their place in the process of the philosophical study of this moral phenomenon. In the early Modern ethics, two approaches to define the essence of shame was developed. Both are very influential in the contemporary ethics and moral psychology. The socialized approach identifies shame with a painful feeling invoked by a negative evaluation of an agent by other people. The desocialized approach considers shame a special kind of autonomous negative self- appraisal. The first was inherited by European ethical thought of the XVI–XVIII centuries as a deep and elaborated tradition rooted in works of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. The second was represented by scattered statements. It left unclarified a peculiarity of shame in comparison with other autonomous negative emotions of self-appraisal. The vast majority of central figures of the period were proponents of the first approach. Descartes and Spinoza were not exceptions. They defined shame as an agent’s sadness caused by being blamed by others. The typology of passions developed by Descartes included some negative emotions of self-appraisal that are not dependent on external blame: remorse and repentance. Though they did not acquire a higher moral status then shame, at least directly. It is only Descartes’s characteristic of pride and inner satisfaction that allows us to trace some evidence of such a priority (if people prone to praise us not only for our good deeds and this circumstance makes pride problematic moral emotion, than their proneness to blame us not only for our vicious actions has the same effect for shame). The main opposition in the French philosopher’s conception of shame is not shame and repentance, but shame and virtue (first of all, the virtue of magnanimity). Shame can be an obstacle for a virtuous agent, but the clear understanding of the natural sociability of humans and the fact that the frailty of the human capacity to judge is compensated only by judgments of others prevent Descartes from recommending a virtuous to rid oneself entirely of shame. For Spinoza, the opposition of shame and virtue is the only one, but his critical arguments against shame are richer (especially, if taking into account the possibility to project Spinoza’s criticism of other effects on shame). His partial rehabilitation of shame is grounded on arguments from social unity and from the easier transition to virtue from shame than from some other affects. Keywords: morality, ethics, moral psychology, early Modern moral philosophy, passions, virtue, shame, repentance, R. Descartes, B. Spinoza DOI 10.22405/2304-4772-2023-1-2-5-19 Как показывает в своей новаторской работе «Стыд в ранненовевропейской мысли: от греха к социабельности» Х. Доусон культура эпохи раннего Нового времени оперировала двумя понятиями стыда. В качестве отправной точки для своего вывода она использует «Полный христианский словарь» Т. Уилсона (первое издание 1612 г.), в котором характеризуются последовательно «стыд лица» (shame of face) («переживание возникающее по причине гражданского бесчестья и запятнанности») и «стыд совести» (shame of conscience) («тревога и возмущение ума и совести, скорбь и печаль при воспоминании о грехе против Бога»), и прослеживает использование этих двух значений слова «стыд» в литературе и философских трактатах эпохи раннего Нового времени (преимущественно английских). «Стыд совести», или, как его называет сама Х. Доусон, «стыд-вина» (guilt- shame), не требует для своего возникновения никакого внешнего взгляда, кроме взгляда всезнающего и вездесущего Бога. Такой стыд возникает в ходе обращения грешника к себе самому и является болезненным осознанием совершенного им греха. Х. Доусон фиксирует постоянно присутствующую в текстах XVII в. ассоциативную связь между «стыдом-виной» и идеями несовершенства человеческой природы и первородного греха. В